

A REPORT FROM

POLICY MATTERS
OHIO

Center for American Progress


GOING BROKE
IN OHIO

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FEBRUARY 2005

I. Executive Summary

In 2003, the bankruptcy rate in the United States and Ohio reached a record high. Ohio's bankruptcy rate climbed more steeply than that of any other state between 2000 and 2003.

By 2003, there were a record 5.5 personal bankruptcy filings for every 1,000 people living in the U.S., and 7.7 personal bankruptcy filings for every 1,000 people living in Ohio. Ohio's rate was eighth highest in the country and higher than all Midwestern states except Indiana's. Only Tennessee, Alabama, Utah, Georgia, Nevada, Indiana and Arkansas had higher bankruptcy rates than Ohio in 2003.

One reason for the high bankruptcy rates is unprecedented levels of borrowing. For the first time since the Federal Reserve started collecting these data in 1952, the average U.S. household had debt totaling more than 115 percent of disposable income (BOG, 2004a). Mortgage debt rose relative to income, while credit card debt held constant at around 10 percent of the average household's disposable income (BOG, 2004b).

Families also had to dedicate more of their income to servicing their debts. Since the recession started in 2001, families nationally have spent 13 percent or more of their disposable income on debt service, the highest rate since the Federal Reserve started collecting this information in 1980 (BOG, 2004c).

The national study found that bankruptcy was correlated with high unemployment, lack of health insurance coverage and low levels of personal disposable income. These variables seemed less explanatory in Ohio, where none of these indicators revealed the same level of comparative distress as the bankruptcy indicator. While only seven states had worse bankruptcy rates than Ohio, 16 states had higher official unemployment rates, 34 states had higher rates of people lacking health insurance coverage, and 26 states had lower levels of personal disposable income.

Bankruptcy rates were higher than divorce rates in 40 states in 2003. Nationally, 3.6 of every 1,000 people filed for divorce, while 5.5 of every 1,000 declared bankruptcy that year. In Ohio the disparity was greater, with 3.6 of every 1,000 people filing for divorce while 7.7 of every 1,000 declared bankruptcy in 2003.

Like foreclosure rates, which have also risen sharply in Ohio, bankruptcy filings are an indication of severe financial distress. The sharp spike in bankruptcy should be closely examined and policy reforms should be adopted to help reduce these rates.

II. Introduction


Ohio is waiting for signs of the economic recovery that may be emerging in some parts of the nation. By December 2004, there were still fewer jobs than at the start of the recession in March 2001 and the state had yet to experience two consecutive months of job growth. Family incomes had fallen for three years in a row through the end of 2003.

At the same time, families nationally experienced sharply higher costs for education, energy, housing, and health care, putting household finances in a bind. Many families faced rising costs for debt acquired in the weak labor market. With higher interest rates, this debt could quickly become more burdensome. Starting in June 2004, the Federal Reserve began to raise interest rates.

The combination of modest income growth and rising costs has already taken a toll on families in Ohio and America. By 2003, the personal bankruptcy rate reached a record high nationally and in Ohio. Nationally, personal bankruptcies have become more closely associated with job loss than in the past, and they have remained sensitive to the lack of health insurance coverage. The situation since 2003 suggests that further increases in personal bankruptcies are possible, as prices have risen further amid a continuously weak labor market.

II. Record bankruptcy levels, U.S. and Ohio

Nationwide, the number of cases of personal bankruptcy has risen in recent years. By 2003, there were a record number of 5.5 personal bankruptcy filings for every 1,000 people living in the U.S. (figure 1).



Sources: ABI (2004); Census (2004); and authors' calculations.

The percent of bankruptcies rose steadily during the 1980s then fell slightly in the mid-1990s before rising again between 1994 and a 1998 peak. The rate fell in 1999 but has risen substantially each year since then.

A variety of factors determine personal bankruptcies. Typically, unforeseen events such as illness or a layoff, coupled with low income and few savings, lead to bankruptcy. Economic research has consistently found that personal bankruptcies are a function of income growth, debt composition (particularly credit card debt) out-of-pocket medical expenditures, debt service, and unemployment, in addition to demographic characteristics (Ausubel, 1997; Chaterjee et al., 2002; Gross and Souleles, 1998; Stavins, 2000; Warren and Tyagi, 2003; Weller and Boushey, 2005).

We examined state-level data on unemployment rates, the share of the population without health insurance, and per capita income levels (BEA, 2004; BLS, 2004a) to determine how well these indicators correlated with the rise in bankruptcies.¹ The recent rise in personal bankruptcies coincided with a persistently weak national labor market that was even weaker in Ohio. By December 2004, there were still 84,000 fewer jobs nationally than at the start of the recession in March 2001 (BLS, 2004b). Ohio had lost 236,900 jobs between the start of the recession and December 2004, 4.2 percent of the state's overall employment. Of the state's manufacturing jobs, 17.7 percent were lost over this period. At the same time, wages barely kept pace with inflation nationally (BLS, 2004c) and declined in Ohio (*State of Working Ohio, 2004*). As a result of weak employment and wage growth, typical national family incomes actually declined by more than \$1,600 in inflation adjusted terms from 1999 to 2003 nationally (Census, 2004). In Ohio, median four-person family income declined by more than \$2,300 between 2000 and 2003 (*State of Working Ohio, 2004*).

During this period, some prices have been growing rapidly nationally. Most notably, health insurance costs rose by 14 percent from 2000 to 2003, while the share of the national population without health insurance increased from 14.2 percent to 15.6 percent (BLS, 2004d, Census). This is of particular importance since lack of health insurance is often tied to personal bankruptcies. Ohio consistently has better rates of health insurance coverage than the nation; 12.1 percent of Ohioans are uninsured.

Households have maintained their consumption by borrowing increasing amounts. For the first time since the Federal Reserve started collecting these data in 1952, the average household had debt totaling more than 115 percent of disposable income (BOG, 2004a). Mortgage debt rose relative to income, while credit card debt held constant at around 10 percent of the average household's disposable income (BOG, 2004b). Disposable income is income after income taxes have been deducted.

With higher debt levels, families also had to dedicate more of their income to servicing their debts. Since the recession started in 2001, families had to spend at or above 13 percent of their disposable income on debt service, the highest rate since the Federal Reserve started collecting this information in 1980 (BOG, 2004c).

¹ See table A-1 in the appendix for detailed state-by-state data.

Personal bankruptcy rates vary widely between states and over time. A ranking of the 50 states plus the District of Columbia shows that there was a large variance among the states in the number of personal bankruptcies per 1,000 people in 2003 (table 1). The average number of bankruptcies per 1,000 people for the U.S. was 5.5 in 2003. Seven states had bankruptcy rates that were 50 percent greater than the average: Tennessee, Alabama, Utah, Georgia, Nevada, Indiana, and Arkansas. Tennessee's rate, the worst in the country, surpassed the U.S. average by 100 percent.

Bankruptcy rates in 2003 were highly correlated with the changes in bankruptcy rates from 2000 to 2003. Seven of the ten states with the highest levels of bankruptcy rates were also among the ten states with the largest increases in bankruptcy rates from 2000 to 2003: Tennessee, Utah, Nevada, Indiana, Arkansas, Ohio, and Oklahoma. That is, higher bankruptcy rates were mostly associated with larger changes in bankruptcy rates over the prior three years.

Ohio had 7.7 bankruptcies for every 1000 people in 2003, higher than the U.S. average of 5.5 and higher than all Midwestern states except Indiana. Ohio's bankruptcy rate was eighth highest in the country, exceeded only by Tennessee, Alabama, Utah, Georgia, Nevada, Indiana and Arkansas. Ohio ranked first in the country in growth in personal bankruptcies per 1000 between 2000 and 2003.

Table 1
Bankruptcy Rankings of 50 States and District of Columbia, 2003


| Ranking | State | Bankruptcies per 1,000 | Change in bankruptcies per 1,000 since 2000 | Ranking by Changes | Unemp. rate (%) | Share without health insurance (%) | Per capita income (\$) | Divorces per 1,000 |
|----------------|--------------|------------------------|---|--------------------|-----------------|------------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------|
| U.S. | | 5.5 | 1.3 | | 5.5 | 15.6 | | 3.6 |
| Top 10 | | 8.8 | 2.3 | | 5.4 | 17.9 | 26221 | 4.2 |
| 1 | Tennessee | 11.1 | 2.6 | 5 | 5.8 | 13.2 | 26389 | 5.0 |
| 2 | Alabama | 9.4 | 0.7 | 36 | 5.8 | 14.2 | 23937 | 4.9 |
| 3 | Utah | 9.2 | 2.6 | 3 | 5.6 | 12.7 | 22802 | 3.7 |
| 4 | Georgia | 9.2 | 2.0 | 11 | 4.7 | 16.4 | 26146 | 4.0 |
| 5 | Nevada | 9.0 | 2.3 | 7 | 5.2 | 18.9 | 28342 | 6.5 |
| 6 | Indiana: | 8.9 | 2.8 | 2 | 5.1 | 13.9 | 25882 | n.a. |
| 7 | Arkansas: | 8.8 | 2.6 | 4 | 6.2 | 17.4 | 22103 | 6.0 |
| 8 | Ohio | 7.7 | 3.1 | 1 | 6.1 | 12.1 | 26649 | 3.5 |
| 9 | Mississippi: | 7.6 | 1.2 | 27 | 6.3 | 17.9 | 21545 | 4.7 |
| 10 | Oklahoma: | 7.6 | 2.2 | 8 | 5.7 | 20.4 | 24042 | n.a. |
| Next 10 | | 6.6 | 1.8 | | 6.3 | 14.2 | 27320 | 3.5 |
| 11 | Kentucky: | 7.2 | 2.1 | 9 | 6.2 | 14.0 | 23603 | 5.1 |
| 12 | Idaho: | 6.9 | 1.6 | 18 | 5.4 | 18.6 | 23239 | 5.1 |
| 13 | Oregon | 6.7 | 1.8 | 15 | 8.2 | 17.2 | 25509 | 4.0 |
| 14 | Illinois: | 6.7 | 1.9 | 13 | 6.7 | 14.4 | 29532 | 2.7 |
| 15 | Missouri | 6.6 | 2.0 | 12 | 5.6 | 11.0 | 26121 | 3.9 |
| 16 | Washington | 6.5 | 1.3 | 22 | 7.5 | 15.5 | 30188 | 4.3 |

| Ranking | State | Bankruptcies per 1,000 | Change in bankruptcies per 1,000 since 2000 | Ranking by Changes | Unemp. rate (%) | Share without health insurance (%) | Per capita income (\$) | Divorces per 1,000 |
|----------------|----------------|------------------------|---|--------------------|-----------------|------------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------|
| 17 | Louisiana: | 6.5 | 1.4 | 20 | 6.6 | 20.6 | 23796 | n.a. |
| 18 | Michigan | 6.2 | 2.6 | 6 | 7.3 | 10.9 | 27985 | 3.6 |
| 19 | Maryland | 6.1 | 0.5 | 41 | 4.5 | 13.9 | 32659 | 2.9 |
| 20 | West Virginia | 6.0 | 1.3 | 23 | 6.1 | 16.6 | 22521 | 4.9 |
| Middle | | 5.3 | 1.5 | | 5.3 | 14.7 | 28291 | 3.8 |
| 21 | Kansas: | 5.8 | 1.7 | 16 | 5.4 | 11.0 | 26602 | 3.3 |
| 22 | Virginia | 5.8 | 0.8 | 35 | 4.1 | 13.0 | 29604 | 4.0 |
| 23 | Colorado: | 5.6 | 2.1 | 10 | 6.0 | 17.2 | 30694 | 4.2 |
| 24 | Arizona | 5.6 | 1.7 | 17 | 5.6 | 17.0 | 24324 | 4.3 |
| 25 | Florida: | 5.5 | 1.0 | 32 | 5.1 | 18.2 | 27089 | 5.0 |
| 26 | Wisconsin | 5.0 | 1.8 | 14 | 5.6 | 10.9 | 27295 | 3.2 |
| 27 | Nebraska: | 4.8 | 1.6 | 19 | 4.0 | 11.3 | 27404 | 3.4 |
| 28 | New Jersey | 4.8 | 0.5 | 42 | 5.9 | 14.0 | 34967 | 3.2 |
| 29 | Wyoming | 4.8 | 0.7 | 37 | 4.4 | 15.9 | 28991 | 5.6 |
| 30 | New Mexico | 4.8 | 1.2 | 26 | 6.4 | 22.1 | 23234 | 3.4 |
| 31 | Pennsylvania: | 4.7 | 1.2 | 25 | 5.6 | 11.4 | 28266 | 3.0 |
| Next 10 | | 4.2 | 1.0 | | 5.7 | 14.0 | 27770 | 3.2 |
| 32 | Montana | 4.7 | 1.1 | 30 | 4.7 | 19.4 | 23356 | 3.3 |
| 33 | North Carolina | 4.6 | 1.3 | 24 | 6.5 | 17.3 | 25306 | 4.4 |
| 34 | Rhode Island | 4.2 | 0.0 | 48 | 5.3 | 10.2 | 28325 | 3.1 |
| 35 | Delaware: | 4.2 | 0.0 | 49 | 4.4 | 11.1 | 29420 | 4.9 |
| 36 | Iowa: | 4.2 | 1.4 | 21 | 4.5 | 11.3 | 25725 | 2.7 |
| 37 | Texas | 4.0 | 1.2 | 28 | 6.8 | 24.6 | 26582 | 3.6 |
| 38 | DC | 4.0 | 1.2 | 29 | 7.0 | 14.3 | 41143 | 2.1 |

| Ranking | State | Bankruptcies per 1,000 | Change in bankruptcies per 1,000 since 2000 | Ranking by Changes | Unemp. rate (%) | Share without health insurance (%) | Per capita income (\$) | Divorces per 1,000 |
|------------------|----------------|---------------------------|--|--------------------------|--------------------|--|---------------------------|-----------------------|
| 39 | Minnesota: | 3.9 | 1.1 | 31 | 5.0 | 8.7 | 29965 | 2.9 |
| 40 | South Carolina | 3.9 | 0.9 | 33 | 6.8 | 14.4 | 23720 | 3.2 |
| 41 | California | 3.9 | -0.2 | 50 | 6.7 | 18.4 | 29458 | n.a. |
| Bottom 10 | | 3.3 | 0.3 | | 4.8 | 10.7 | 28381 | 3.4 |
| 42 | New York | 3.8 | 0.8 | 34 | 6.3 | 15.1 | 31188 | 3.2 |
| 43 | South Dakota | 3.6 | 0.2 | 46 | 3.6 | 12.2 | 26188 | 3.3 |
| 44 | Maine | 3.5 | 0.5 | 43 | 5.1 | 10.4 | 25963 | 4.4 |
| 45 | Connecticut: | 3.5 | 0.4 | 45 | 5.5 | 10.4 | 36774 | 2.9 |
| 46 | North Dakota | 3.5 | 0.6 | 40 | 4.0 | 10.9 | 26248 | 2.7 |
| 47 | New Hampshire | 3.3 | 0.6 | 38 | 4.3 | 10.3 | 31197 | 3.6 |
| 48 | Hawaii: | 3.0 | -0.7 | 51 | 4.3 | 10.1 | 27466 | n.a. |
| 49 | Vermont | 2.9 | 0.6 | 39 | 4.6 | 9.5 | 27486 | 4.4 |
| 50 | Massachusetts | 2.8 | 0.4 | 44 | 5.8 | 10.7 | 34088 | 2.5 |
| 51 | Alaska | 2.1 | 0.1 | 47 | 8.0 | 18.9 | 30272 | 4.9 |

Notes: Sources are ABI (2004), Census (2004), Munson and Sutton (2004), BEA (2004), BLS (2004c). Group averages are population weighted averages.

Bankruptcy rates grew more sharply in Ohio than in any other state between 2000 and 2003. By 2003, individuals in Ohio were 3.5 times more likely to file for bankruptcy than they were in 1980, when the rate was 2.2 per 1000. As Figure 2 shows, Ohio’s bankruptcy rate was higher than that of the U.S. in 1980, when the rate was 2.2 bankruptcies per 1,000 people in Ohio (data labels in italic font), and 1.3 bankruptcies per 1,000 people nationally (data labels in bold font). In the early 1980s, the rate reached a low of 1.6 in Ohio and of 1.2 nationally. Rates in the state and nation then climbed steadily, peaking at 4.0 in Ohio in 1991 and 3.5 nationally in 1992, falling again to a low of 2.7 locally in 1994 (when it crept below the 2.9 national level for the only time), and climbing steadily since then to an unprecedented high of 7.7 in 2003.



Sources: ABI (2004); Census (2004); and authors’ calculations.

Examination by the Center for American Progress of the national data indicated that bankruptcies were higher in states with lower levels of health insurance coverage and lower personal disposable income. However, Ohio’s bankruptcy rate is worse compared to other states than these other indicators. While only seven states had worse bankruptcy rates than Ohio, 16 states had higher official unemployment rates, 34 states had higher rates of people lacking health insurance coverage, and 26 states had lower levels of personal disposable income. Only two states, Michigan and Massachusetts, rank worse than Ohio in percentage of jobs lost since the start of the 2001 recession.

Table 2: Ohio ranking among states on indicators of distress

| | |
|-------------------------------------|------------------|
| Bankruptcies | 8 th |
| Unemployment | 17 th |
| Lack of health insurance | 35 th |
| Disposable income, rank from bottom | 27 th |

Bankruptcy rates exceed divorce rates

Bankruptcy rates were higher than divorce rates in 40 states in 2003. Nationally, 3.6 of every 1,000 people filed for divorce, while 5.5 of every 1,000 people declared bankruptcy in 2003. In Ohio, 3.5 of every 1,000 people filed for divorce while 7.7 of every 1,000 people declared bankruptcy in 2003.

III. Rising rates in the states

Bankruptcy rates are fairly variable. This is confirmed when we look at the biggest movements in states' position in the bankruptcy rate rankings over time. States vary widely in the contraction and expansion of their bankruptcy levels. For example, as Table 3 shows, Ohio was among the top ten in improving its bankruptcy rate relative to other states in the 1980s, but among the top ten in worsening the rate between 2000 and 2003. As before, a higher position in the ranking indicates a larger number of personal bankruptcies for every 1,000 people.

Table 3: Top Ten Gainers and Losers in Personal Bankruptcy Rate Rankings

| 1980 to 1989 | | 1990 to 2000 | | 2001 to 2003 | |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------|--------------|-------------------|--------------|-------------------|
| State | Change in Ranking | State | Change in Ranking | State | Change in Ranking |
| Top 10 Bankruptcy Rate Improvements | | | | | |
| NY | 16 | CO | 28 | HI | 19 |
| NC | 16 | MN | 28 | CA | 15 |
| NE | 11 | AZ | 22 | DC | 11 |
| MI | 11 | TX | 17 | RI | 11 |
| ME | 11 | NH | 15 | MD | 10 |
| IL | 11 | AK | 14 | SD | 8 |
| OH | 10 | CA | 11 | VA | 7 |
| HI | 10 | NE | 10 | CT | 6 |
| DC | 10 | IA | 9 | NJ | 6 |
| IA | 9 | KA | 8 | FL | 4 |
| Avg. | 11.5 | | 16.2 | | 9.7 |

Top 10 Bankruptcy Rate Deteriorations

| | | | | | |
|-------------|--------------|----|--------------|----|-------------|
| NH | -7 | WA | -8 | MO | -5 |
| GA | -7 | LA | -9 | DE | -6 |
| AK | -9 | ME | -9 | MN | -7 |
| UT | -10 | NJ | -13 | TX | -8 |
| OK | -11 | PA | -14 | CO | -10 |
| MN | -12 | AR | -15 | NE | -10 |
| WY | -13 | DC | -15 | OH | -10 |
| AZ | -16 | WV | -17 | IA | -11 |
| TX | -21 | HI | -22 | MI | -12 |
| FL | -22 | MD | -25 | WI | -12 |
| Avg. | -11.8 | | -13.6 | | -8.8 |

Note: In each year, states are ranked by bankruptcy rate, with the highest bankruptcy rate receiving a ranking of “1” and the lowest a ranking of “51.” A positive change indicates a higher-ranking number in the later years, i.e. an improvement in the state’s bankruptcy rate relative to the other 50 entities.

Links to other indicators

Nationally, bankruptcy was closely tied to disposable income. For most states, higher income levels and larger income gains (in inflation-adjusted terms) were associated with a lower incidence of personal bankruptcy and smaller changes in personal bankruptcy rates. A one percent increase in the inflation-adjusted per capita disposable income lowered the bankruptcy rate by 1.1 percent. For the most recent business cycle, a higher unemployment rate, larger shares of the population without health insurance, and lower incomes also tended to be associated with more personal bankruptcy cases relative to population. Specifically, bankruptcy rates tend to be higher in states with smaller shares of people having health insurance. Each one percent increase in the share of the population without health insurance is associated with a 0.5 percent increase in the personal bankruptcy rate.² Similarly, each one percent increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a half percent increase in the personal bankruptcy rate. Bankruptcy rates were more than twice as sensitive to changes in disposable income as they were to changes in health insurance coverage and to changes in the unemployment rate from 2000 to 2003. However, none of these indicators fully explain the large spikes in bankruptcy rates in the nation and in Ohio.

Changes over time

The relationship between personal bankruptcy rates and economic variables has changed over time. Because households have more debt and because they have to pay more for debt service out of their disposable income, they may have become more vulnerable to unexpected economic events. Unfortunately, there are no state data on household debt. However, household debt across the country has reached record highs in

² Technically speaking, the slope is the elasticity of the bankruptcy rate with respect to the unemployment rate or the health insurance coverage.

recent years. This may make families more susceptible to unforeseen events and more likely to declare bankruptcy earlier than they were in the past.

Although bankruptcies have always risen in response to higher unemployment rates, lower average unemployment rates are now associated with higher bankruptcy rates than was the case in the past. The most recent business cycle, which was characterized by higher bankruptcy rates, was also characterized by lower unemployment rates. One reason may be that long-term unemployment has grown – this indicator reached a twenty-year high nationally and in Ohio during the past recession (Weller and Chaurushiya, 2004).³

Over time, higher bankruptcy rates are consistently associated with lower incomes. While states with the lowest bankruptcy rates in the 1980s had 12 percent more income than states with the highest bankruptcy rates, they had on average 18 percent more income in the most recent business cycle (table 3).

IV. Conclusion

Another year of rising consumption and growing debt levels amid a weak labor market has passed. This likely gave rise to increases in already record high personal bankruptcy rates in 2003. Personal bankruptcies reached record-high levels in the United States and Ohio in 2003. Ohio's rate increased more quickly than that of any other state between 2000 and 2003, and the state now ranks eighth in its bankruptcy rate. Ohio's high rates of job loss and long-term unemployment may explain the spike in bankruptcy in this state. Nationally, bankruptcy increases are correlated with low disposable income levels, lack of health insurance, and high unemployment. However, Ohio's relative ranking on these indicators is not nearly as problematic as its ranking on bankruptcy.

There are many general recommendations that could be made to increase disposable income, reduce rates of non-insurance, boost job growth and reduce unemployment. However, we feel that it is important to more carefully assess the causes of this steep climb in an indicator of severe financial distress.

³ Formal statistical tests show that the elasticity of bankruptcy rates with respect to the unemployment rate was higher in the most recent business cycle than in previous ones.

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Table A-1
State-by-State Data on Personal Bankruptcies, Unemployment, Health Insurance Coverage and Personal Disposable Income

| State | Bankruptcy rate per 1,000 | | | | Unemployment rate | | | | Share without health insurance | | | Personal disposable income | | | |
|-------|---------------------------|------|------|------|-------------------|------|------|------|--------------------------------|------|------|----------------------------|----------|----------|----------|
| | 1980 | 1990 | 2000 | 2003 | 1980 | 1990 | 2000 | 2003 | 1990 | 2000 | 2003 | 1980 | 1990 | 2000 | 2003 |
| AL | 2.4 | 6.0 | 8.6 | 9.4 | 8.8 | 6.9 | 4.5 | 5.8 | 17.9 | 13.3 | 14.2 | \$15,555 | \$19,775 | \$22,492 | \$23,937 |
| AK | 0.5 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 9.7 | 7.0 | 6.7 | 8.0 | 15.4 | 18.7 | 18.9 | \$28,911 | \$28,363 | \$28,233 | \$30,272 |
| AZ | 1.2 | 4.3 | 3.9 | 5.6 | 6.7 | 5.5 | 4.0 | 5.6 | 15.5 | 16.7 | 17.0 | \$18,887 | \$21,301 | \$23,857 | \$24,324 |
| AR | 1.0 | 2.8 | 6.2 | 8.8 | 7.6 | 7.0 | 4.4 | 6.2 | 17.4 | 14.3 | 17.4 | \$14,970 | \$18,283 | \$20,705 | \$22,103 |
| CA | 1.7 | 3.4 | 4.1 | 3.9 | 6.8 | 5.8 | 4.9 | 6.7 | 19.1 | 18.5 | 18.4 | \$23,319 | \$26,567 | \$28,549 | \$29,458 |
| CO | 1.7 | 4.7 | 3.5 | 5.6 | 5.9 | 5.0 | 2.8 | 6.0 | 14.7 | 14.3 | 17.2 | \$20,812 | \$24,216 | \$30,171 | \$30,694 |
| CT | 0.6 | 1.6 | 3.1 | 3.5 | 5.9 | 5.2 | 2.2 | 5.5 | 6.9 | 9.8 | 10.4 | \$23,641 | \$32,550 | \$35,676 | \$36,774 |
| DE | 0.7 | 1.4 | 3.0 | 4.2 | 7.7 | 5.2 | 3.9 | 4.4 | 13.9 | 9.3 | 11.1 | \$20,030 | \$26,008 | \$28,080 | \$29,420 |
| DC | 0.9 | 1.6 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 7.3 | 6.6 | 5.7 | 7.0 | 19.2 | 14.0 | 14.3 | \$23,335 | \$32,180 | \$35,673 | \$41,143 |
| FL | 0.5 | 2.6 | 4.4 | 5.5 | 5.9 | 6.0 | 3.6 | 5.1 | 18.0 | 17.7 | 18.2 | \$19,570 | \$24,672 | \$26,512 | \$27,089 |
| GA | 1.8 | 6.1 | 7.2 | 9.2 | 6.4 | 5.5 | 3.7 | 4.7 | 15.3 | 14.3 | 16.4 | \$16,544 | \$21,770 | \$25,702 | \$26,146 |
| HI | 0.6 | 0.7 | 3.7 | 3.0 | 4.9 | 2.9 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 7.3 | 9.4 | 10.1 | \$22,346 | \$27,127 | \$26,539 | \$27,466 |
| ID | 1.8 | 3.7 | 5.3 | 6.9 | 7.9 | 5.9 | 4.9 | 5.4 | 15.2 | 15.4 | 18.6 | \$17,237 | \$19,692 | \$22,396 | \$23,239 |
| IL | 2.1 | 3.1 | 4.8 | 6.7 | 8.3 | 6.2 | 4.3 | 6.7 | 10.9 | 13.9 | 14.4 | \$21,133 | \$25,577 | \$29,293 | \$29,532 |
| IN | 2.2 | 4.1 | 6.1 | 8.9 | 9.6 | 5.3 | 3.2 | 5.1 | 10.7 | 11.2 | 13.9 | \$18,284 | \$21,635 | \$25,270 | \$25,882 |
| IA | 1.0 | 1.7 | 2.8 | 4.2 | 5.8 | 4.3 | 2.6 | 4.5 | 8.1 | 8.8 | 11.3 | \$18,579 | \$21,637 | \$24,992 | \$25,725 |
| KA | 1.6 | 3.3 | 4.1 | 5.8 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 3.7 | 5.4 | 10.8 | 10.9 | 11.0 | \$19,269 | \$22,484 | \$25,696 | \$26,602 |
| KY | 2.0 | 3.6 | 5.1 | 7.2 | 8.0 | 5.9 | 4.1 | 6.2 | 13.2 | 13.6 | 14.0 | \$16,163 | \$19,176 | \$22,809 | \$23,603 |
| LA | 1.0 | 2.7 | 5.0 | 6.5 | 6.7 | 6.3 | 5.5 | 6.6 | 19.7 | 18.1 | 20.6 | \$17,150 | \$19,271 | \$21,986 | \$23,796 |
| ME | 0.7 | 1.2 | 3.0 | 3.5 | 7.8 | 5.2 | 3.5 | 5.1 | 11.2 | 10.9 | 10.4 | \$16,667 | \$21,662 | \$24,032 | \$25,963 |
| MD | 0.8 | 1.9 | 5.6 | 6.1 | 6.5 | 4.7 | 3.8 | 4.5 | 12.7 | 10.4 | 13.9 | \$21,238 | \$27,580 | \$30,774 | \$32,659 |
| MA | 0.5 | 1.4 | 2.4 | 2.8 | 5.6 | 6.0 | 2.6 | 5.8 | 9.1 | 8.7 | 10.7 | \$20,215 | \$27,867 | \$32,388 | \$34,088 |
| MI | 1.4 | 2.0 | 3.6 | 6.2 | 12.4 | 7.6 | 3.5 | 7.3 | 9.4 | 9.2 | 10.9 | \$20,059 | \$23,329 | \$27,179 | \$27,985 |
| MN | 1.0 | 3.0 | 2.8 | 3.9 | 5.9 | 4.9 | 3.3 | 5.0 | 8.9 | 8.1 | 8.7 | \$19,735 | \$24,361 | \$29,050 | \$29,965 |
| MS | 1.8 | 4.2 | 6.4 | 7.6 | 7.5 | 7.6 | 5.6 | 6.3 | 19.9 | 13.6 | 17.9 | \$14,079 | \$16,767 | \$20,235 | \$21,545 |
| MO | 1.3 | 2.6 | 4.6 | 6.6 | 7.2 | 5.8 | 3.4 | 5.6 | 12.7 | 9.5 | 11.0 | \$18,183 | \$21,872 | \$25,299 | \$26,121 |
| MT | 1.1 | 2.2 | 3.5 | 4.7 | 6.1 | 6.0 | 5.0 | 4.7 | 14.0 | 16.8 | 19.4 | \$17,764 | \$19,421 | \$21,623 | \$23,356 |
| NE | 1.5 | 2.3 | 3.2 | 4.8 | 4.1 | 2.2 | 3.0 | 4.0 | 8.5 | 9.1 | 11.3 | \$17,898 | \$22,569 | \$25,742 | \$27,404 |
| NV | 2.3 | 5.0 | 6.8 | 9.0 | 6.2 | 4.9 | 4.0 | 5.2 | 16.5 | 16.8 | 18.9 | \$23,000 | \$25,152 | \$28,127 | \$28,342 |
| NH | 0.6 | 1.9 | 2.7 | 3.3 | 4.7 | 5.7 | 2.8 | 4.3 | 9.9 | 8.4 | 10.3 | \$19,423 | \$25,752 | \$30,526 | \$31,197 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|------|------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| NJ | 0.6 | 1.8 | 4.3 | 4.8 | 7.2 | 5.1 | 3.7 | 5.9 | 10.0 | 12.2 | 14.0 | \$22,518 | \$30,100 | \$34,209 | \$34,967 |
| NM | 1.0 | 2.5 | 3.6 | 4.8 | 7.5 | 6.5 | 5.0 | 6.4 | 22.2 | 24.2 | 22.1 | \$16,710 | \$18,883 | \$20,919 | \$23,234 |
| NY | 1.1 | 1.7 | 3.0 | 3.8 | 7.5 | 5.3 | 4.6 | 6.3 | 12.1 | 16.3 | 15.1 | \$21,044 | \$28,414 | \$30,862 | \$31,188 |
| NC | 1.2 | 1.7 | 3.3 | 4.6 | 6.6 | 4.2 | 3.6 | 6.5 | 13.8 | 13.6 | 17.3 | \$16,015 | \$21,393 | \$25,001 | \$25,306 |
| ND | 0.6 | 1.4 | 2.9 | 3.5 | 5.0 | 4.0 | 3.0 | 4.0 | 6.3 | 11.3 | 10.9 | \$15,479 | \$20,353 | \$24,147 | \$26,248 |
| OH | 2.2 | 3.5 | 4.6 | 7.7 | 8.4 | 5.7 | 4.0 | 6.1 | 10.3 | 11.2 | 12.1 | \$19,584 | \$23,153 | \$25,927 | \$26,649 |
| OK | 1.4 | 4.3 | 5.3 | 7.6 | 4.8 | 5.7 | 3.1 | 5.7 | 18.6 | 18.9 | 20.4 | \$18,487 | \$20,103 | \$22,994 | \$24,042 |
| OR | 1.6 | 3.9 | 4.9 | 6.7 | 8.3 | 5.6 | 4.9 | 8.2 | 12.4 | 12.7 | 17.2 | \$19,496 | \$22,276 | \$25,545 | \$25,509 |
| PA | 0.5 | 1.4 | 3.5 | 4.7 | 7.8 | 5.4 | 4.1 | 5.6 | 10.1 | 8.7 | 11.4 | \$19,581 | \$24,417 | \$27,328 | \$28,266 |
| RI | 0.8 | 2.0 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 7.2 | 6.8 | 4.1 | 5.3 | 1.4 | 7.4 | 10.2 | \$18,927 | \$24,832 | \$26,777 | \$28,325 |
| SC | 0.3 | 1.5 | 2.9 | 3.9 | 6.9 | 4.8 | 3.8 | 6.8 | 16.2 | 12.1 | 14.4 | \$15,287 | \$19,843 | \$22,976 | \$23,720 |
| SD | 0.6 | 1.6 | 3.4 | 3.6 | 4.9 | 3.9 | 2.3 | 3.6 | 11.6 | 11.0 | 12.2 | \$16,339 | \$20,866 | \$24,751 | \$26,188 |
| TN | 2.6 | 7.2 | 8.5 | 11.1 | 7.3 | 5.3 | 3.9 | 5.8 | 13.7 | 10.9 | 13.2 | \$16,538 | \$21,289 | \$25,014 | \$26,389 |
| TX | 0.4 | 2.2 | 2.8 | 4.0 | 5.2 | 6.3 | 4.2 | 6.8 | 21.1 | 22.9 | 24.6 | \$19,121 | \$21,994 | \$26,675 | \$26,582 |
| UT | 1.4 | 4.0 | 6.6 | 9.2 | 6.3 | 4.3 | 3.3 | 5.6 | 9.0 | 12.5 | 12.7 | \$16,935 | \$18,579 | \$22,227 | \$22,802 |
| VT | 0.3 | 0.9 | 2.3 | 2.9 | 6.4 | 5.0 | 2.9 | 4.6 | 9.5 | 8.6 | 9.5 | \$16,987 | \$22,186 | \$25,655 | \$27,486 |
| VA | 1.5 | 3.0 | 5.0 | 5.8 | 5.0 | 4.3 | 2.2 | 4.1 | 15.7 | 11.6 | 13.0 | \$19,584 | \$25,160 | \$28,008 | \$29,604 |
| WA | 1.5 | 2.9 | 5.1 | 6.5 | 7.9 | 4.9 | 5.2 | 7.5 | 11.4 | 13.5 | 15.5 | \$21,182 | \$24,884 | \$29,181 | \$30,188 |
| WV | 0.7 | 1.8 | 4.6 | 6.0 | 9.4 | 8.4 | 5.5 | 6.1 | 13.8 | 14.1 | 16.6 | \$15,919 | \$18,252 | \$20,875 | \$22,521 |
| WI | 0.9 | 1.9 | 3.2 | 5.0 | 7.2 | 4.4 | 3.6 | 5.6 | 6.7 | 7.6 | 10.9 | \$19,619 | \$22,245 | \$26,179 | \$27,295 |
| WY | 0.8 | 2.8 | 4.1 | 4.8 | 4.0 | 5.5 | 3.9 | 4.4 | 12.5 | 15.7 | 15.9 | \$22,812 | \$22,735 | \$26,179 | \$28,991 |

Sources: ABI (2004); Census (2004); BEA (2004), BLS (2004c)

The **Center for American Progress** is a nonpartisan research and educational institute dedicated to promoting a strong, just and free America that ensures opportunity for all. National report author Christian Weller is a Senior Economist at the Center for American Progress, where he specializes in Social Security and retirement income, macroeconomics, the Federal Reserve, and international finance. Prior to joining American Progress, he was on the research staff at the Economic Policy Institute, where he remains a research associate. Dr. Weller holds a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst.

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